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Bank-issued warrants are securitized options which are particularly designed to give 
smaller individual investors the opportunity to participate in the derivative markets. As banks 
incorporate potentially different margins on top of the theoretical fair values of the products, 
investors face the problem of choosing an optimal product. While previous literature has 
characterized individual investors as “noise traders”, this paper finds that they do act price-
sensitively. In particular, we provide evidence that demand decreases with increasing 
margins, but also show that larger investors still realize lower margins than smaller investors. 
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1. Bank-Issued Warrants vs. Classical 
Warrants
Since the late 1990s, banks and other financial institutions 
in Europe and Asia have been issuing securitized options, 
also referred to as warrants, which are primarily aimed at 
the individual investor. In contrast to US and other warrant 
markets, where warrants are usually written on the issuer’s 
own stock, these bank-issued warrants have a broad 
range of underlying securities, e.g., various single stocks, 
stock indices, or commodities. While the “traditional” 
warrants entitle the holder to buy new shares of the issuing 
companies, bank-issued warrants in Europe and Asia refer 
to existing shares, or, are simply cash-settled, i.e., they pay 
the holder a cash amount equal to the intrinsic value at 
maturity. By the nature of this security design, the bank 
always takes the short position, and the investor always takes 
the long position. After issuance, the warrants are traded 
on an exchange. In many European and Asian countries, 
markets for bank-issued options coexist with “classical” 
options markets organized by options exchanges. On an 
options exchange, market participants deal with a central 
counterpart and a number of (competing) market makers. 
In contrast, the counterpart and at the same time the 
market maker for bank-issued options is the issuing bank 
itself. As a consequence, investors of bank-issued options 
face the risk of a default of the issuer, while with an options 
exchange this risk is eliminated by a central clearing house. 
Another major difference is the market access for small 
investors. To trade on an options exchange, an individual 
investor usually has to sign a special agreement with a 
broker. Furthermore, minimum trading lots apply, which 
can be too high for small investors. In contrast, bank-issued 
warrants are especially designed also for small investors 
who can trade these instruments with small volumes and 
fewer restrictions.
2. Bank Margins and Investors’ Choice
2.1 Banks’ Price-Setting Policy 
Issuers of retail derivatives charge prices above the 
product’s theoretical fair model value (e.g., Entrop et al., 
2009). This difference between theoretical fair values and 
quoted prices is the “margin” (see Figure 1). At issuance, 
usually both the bid price and the ask price are higher than 
the theoretical value. The ask price must be higher than 
the theoretical value to cover structuring costs, marketing 
costs, and other operational costs of the bank, and to 
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ensure a profit contribution for each product sold to an 
investor. Furthermore, banks usually set the bid price close 
to the ask price to send a signal of quality to investors: 
While the theoretical fair value and thus the margin is not 
directly observable, the bid-ask spread is. Because of the 
restriction on short-selling, banks need not fear arbitrage by 
other market participants when the bid price is above the 
theoretical fair value.
Figure 1: Definition of the margin and its decrease over 
time
Notes: Near issuance, both the ask price and the bid price are 
usually above the theoretical fair value. The gross margin is defined 
as the difference between the midpoint of the bid-ask interval and 
the theoretical value. As a usual pattern, the margin decreases 
over the lifecycle of a product and reaches values near zero close 
to maturity.
Previous studies have shown that the margin decreases 
during the lifecycle of the products (e.g., Wilkens et al., 
2003; Baule, 2011). Such a decrease is plausible; close to 
maturity, the theoretical value converges to the intrinsic 
value, which is observable and thus transparent. This 
transparency leaves little space for a margin, which must 
thus be close to zero.
2.2 How Can Investors Compare Margins?
However, as investors usually do not buy such products 
close to maturity, the opaqueness of the margin makes it 
difficult for them to compare the advantages of different 
products. For an accurate comparison of margins, investors 
would have to evaluate the products with appropriate 
mathematical valuation methods. The prevailing opinion in 
the literature is that individual investors are “noise traders” 
and lack the cognitive competence to conduct such a 
(mathematically demanding) comparison of margins (e.g., 
Meyer et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, even for individual investors with relatively 
low mathematical reasoning abilities, there are ways 
to deduce margins indirectly and thus to invest margin 
sensitively. Investors could find similar products of different 
issuers and compare these similar products with regard to 
their prices with the help of certain online finance portals. 
Such a comparison can either cover product properties or 
the issuing bank. For example, investors might specifically 
search for warrants written on the German market index 
DAX with a strike of 11,000 and a time to maturity of three 
months. Such a search produces hits from numerous 
different issuers. For identical product properties, investors 
can directly compare prices (neglecting only minor 
aspects like differences in the bank’s credit rating or the 
bid-ask spread). 
Another possibility would be for investors to search for 
“at the money” warrants with a strike between 10,500 and 
11,500 written on the DAX. As product properties differ 
(slightly) in this case, a simple comparison of prices is hardly 
precise. Nevertheless, investors could compare indicators 
for the incorporated margin, such as the product’s implied 
volatility, which is also provided by some online finance 
portals. This, at least, enables investors to indirectly choose 
the cheapest warrant with a relatively low degree of 
inaccuracy. 
The mental effort for this approach, however, is not 
negligible. Many researchers doubt whether investors are 
able to perform higher orders of cognitive action (for an 
overview see Blonski & Blonski, 2015), and the question of 
whether a considerable proportion of investors really invests 
margin sensitively remains unanswered. Blonski (2014) and 
Baule & Blonski (forthcoming) credit individual investors with 
at least some cognitive abilities regarding their investment 
decisions. In the following we investigate this research 
question in more detail by analyzing the impact of margins 
on the demand for warrants.
3. The Warrants Market on the 
European Warrant Exchange (EUWAX)
We analyze the demand for bank-issued warrants on 
the world’s largest warrants market, the EUWAX in Stuttgart, 
Germany. There is an extremely large variety of different 
products on this market. As of May 2015, investors have 
a choice between more than 400,000 different warrants, 
in addition to another 1,000,000 other retail derivative 
products.
Our warrants data set covers all trades of plain-vanilla 
call warrants on the German market index, DAX, which 
were tradable on the EUWAX for a 1-year period, from 
January through December 2009. We concentrate on call 
warrants in order to avoid incorporating the early exercise 
premium of American-style put warrants as a potential 
source of pricing uncertainty. Figure 2 illustrates the trading 
activity of call warrants, grouped by moneyness and time 
to maturity. The upper graph shows the total turnover in 
million euro, the lower graph the total number of executed 
call orders. At-the-money and slightly-out-of-the-money 
calls with a remaining time to maturity of up to 9 months 
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show the highest trading activity. In general, trading activity 
decreases with longer times to maturity. Furthermore, the 
relevance of the differentiation between the two measures 
for trading activity becomes obvious here. For instance, 
deep-out-of-the-money calls with very short times to 
maturity exhibit a considerable trading activity in terms of 
executed orders, but a very small turnover in million euro. 
This is because short-term deep-out-of-the-money calls are 
extremely cheap.
Figure 2: Trading activity of DAX call warrants on the EUWAX separated by warrant characteristics
Notes: Warrants are clustered according to their remaining time to maturity and moneyness. The upper graph shows the total number 
of executed orders, the lower graph the total turnover in million euro. The brightness of each cluster indicates the trading activity, high 
trading activity being indicated by a dark cluster.
In order to create a homogenous dataset we focus on 
warrants written on the DAX issued by one of the largest 
five issuers in this market segment (Citibank, Commerzbank, 
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC). Furthermore, we 
only consider warrants with a time to maturity between 
one and twelve months and a moneyness of +15% to –15%, 
where moneyness is defined as the relative difference 
between underlying and strike price, (S-X)/S. This restriction 
rules out warrants with a value of a few cents (which 
are short-termed and/or deep-out-of-the-money). The 
resulting dataset contains about 23,000 buy transactions 
of call warrants at the EUWAX. The overall average margin 
charged by issuers amounts to 2.13% and the average 
trading volume per warrant and day to 4,000 euro. On 
average, due to the large variety of existing products, a 
single warrant is traded only every second day. Table 1 
shows some further descriptive statistics about trading 
activities for different issuers and their margins.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Total Demand Average Demand Average Margin
Trades Volume Trades Volume Mean Std.dev.
Citibank 3,588 35.064 0.36 3,250 3.56% 3.91%
Commerzbank 4,329 32.486 0.32 2,208 1.48% 3.40%
Deutsche Bank 12,955 115.302 0.76 6,292 1.76% 3.15%
Goldman Sachs 1,894 12.241 0.60 3,529 3.85% 4.94%
HSBC Trinkaus 401 2.578 0.19 1,118 0.16% 4.52%
Total 23,167 197.671 0.51 3,965 2.13% 3.75%
Notes: Categorized by issuer, the table provides the total trading volume (measured as number of trades and trading volume in million 
euro), furthermore the average demand figures (number of trades per warrant and per day, trading volume per warrant and day in 
euro), and finally the average margin and the standard deviation of the margin. The figures are restricted to our subsample, that is, 
warrants on the DAX with moneyness ±15% and time to maturity 1–12 months in 2009. Furthermore, any trades that are omitted during the 
data processing because of non-assignable DAX levels, non-determinable trade direction, or unreasonable trade size, are not included. 
Adapted from Baule & Blonski (forthcoming).
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4. The Demand Function
4.1 Unconditional Demand 
We analyze the demand function, that is, the relationship 
between the incorporated margin and the demand for 
a warrant. In order to take the impact of further aspects 
(like the time to maturity, the moneyness or other factors) 
into consideration, we do not simply determine demand 
for different levels of margins but control for such potential 
factors by running a regression. The regression design reads 
as follows:2
❶
where Demandi,t is the total demand for warrant i on day 
t and Marginintervalk,i,t are indicator variables which take 
the value 1 if warrant i lies in interval k on day t. The margin 
intervals cover the range from –1% to +15%. The regression 
coefficients βk measure differences in demand between 
different margin intervals for warrants with otherwise 
identical product properties (identical control variables for 
strike and time to maturity). Figure 3 illustrates the empirical 
demand function (i.e., the coefficients for different margin 
intervals with their standard errors). The reference point for 
this analysis is the group of the most expensive warrants with 
a margin larger than 15%. Change in demand is expressed 
in euro per day.
Figure 3: Unconditional demand function
Notes: The graph shows the daily warrant demand relative to 
the most expensive warrants (margin > 15%) for different margin 
intervals (after controlling for a number of influential factors). The 
vertical bars indicate standard errors of the estimates. Demand 
decreases sharply with margins up to 2%, whereas the decrease 
becomes less steep for higher margins.
It becomes obvious that products with lower margins 
indeed attract more demand. For warrants with margins 
between 0% and 4% (the most common margin-range) 
an increase of margins by one percentage point leads to 
a decrease in demand of about 1,500 euro per day. This 
magnitude is quite remarkable, especially when considering 
the average trading volume of about 4,000 euro per day 
and warrant.3 The decreasing shape resembles a classical 
convex demand function. The decrease in demand is 
rather steep for margins of up to 1.5%. Above this level, the 
function becomes flatter. 
4.2 Realized Margins by Order Size
After confirming a general price sensitivity of retail 
warrant investors, we additionally differentiate between 
larger and smaller investors. According to previous literature 
(for an overview see e.g. Barber and Odean, 2013), larger 
investors should act more rationally and professionally and 
should thus be able to realize smaller margins. Furthermore, 
given the fixed information costs for a margin analysis, 
such an analysis is more rewarding for larger trades than 
for smaller ones. We thus assume that, on average, larger 
trades are realized at lower margins than smaller trades. 
Figure 4 shows the magnitude of realized margins by order 
size. It becomes obvious that larger investors indeed pay 
lower margins on average. While trades of up to 500 euro 
are realized with margins of about 3.6%, trades with an 
order size of 10,000 euro are realized with margins of about 
2.3% and trades with an order size larger than 50,000 euro 
are realized with margins of slightly below 2%.
Figure 4: Realized margins for different trade sizes
Notes: The graph shows the average unconditionally realized 
margins for different intervals of order size. The vertical bars indicate 
standard errors of the estimates.
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Summing up the results shown so far, individual investors 
do invest margin sensitively even though the identification 
of margins requires no inconsiderable cognitive effort. 
Furthermore, investors with larger order sizes are more 
sensitive to margins than investors who invest smaller 
amounts of money. 
4.3 Relative Demand
The analysis hitherto has focused on absolute margins. 
Following the ideas mentioned above, individual investors 
should primarily be concerned with comparing similar 
products. While on the one hand, investors could (for 
simplification) compare prices of the products with the 
same properties offered by different issuers, on the other, 
they could also compare prices of products with (slightly) 
differing features issued by the same bank. 
Thus, if investors compare margins between issuers, we 
hypothesize that demand would decrease for a specific 
product if a cheaper competing product with the same 
product characteristics were available. If investors 
compare margins of similar products of the same issuer, 
we hypothesize that demand for a specific product 
would decrease if a cheaper comparable product were 
available. 
We operationalize our investigation by always focusing 
on the cheapest alternative product available from the 
perspective of the investor – either the cheapest warrant 
offered by another issuer or the cheapest similar warrant 
offered by the same issuer. We define “similar” products as 
those with a deviation in the strike price of maximal 50 to 
100 basis points. (For the sake of brevity we thus neglect 
the time to maturity and focus purely on the strike.) In order 
to measure relative demand, we calculate differences in 
margins between the warrant in question and the cheapest 
alternative product. As before, we divide these differences 
into intervals. 
Positive margin differences signify that warrants with 
lower margins exist. Negative margin differences, on 
the other hand, imply that the warrant in question is the 
cheapest available warrant. We thus run the following 
regression model:4
❷
are 13 indicator variables 
which represent the intervals of margin differences to the 
respective cheapest bank from –3% to > +8%. They take 
the value 1 if warrant i lies in margin-difference interval k 
on day t. Analogously,  are 
13 other indicator variables which represent intervals of 
margin-differences to the warrant with the lowest margin 
which exhibits similar product characteristics and is issued 
by the same bank.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the average change in demand 
subject to differences in margins to the cheapest bank, or, 
the cheapest warrant of the same bank with a similar strike, 
respectively (measured by the regression coefficients β1,k 
and β2,k. We obtain relative margin-difference functions 
which show the differences in margins (i) relative to the 
cheapest competitor and (ii) relative to the cheapest 
warrant with similar product properties. The reference 
points of these analyses are formed by warrants with margin 
differences of 0%. 
Figure 5 illustrates investors’ willingness to leave a certain 
bank and to go to another institute in order to realize lower 
margins. In line with our results on unconditional demand, 
the demand for a certain product is significantly higher if it is 
the product with the lowest margin. It is interesting to note, 
however, that the magnitude of the difference in margins is 
relatively unimportant. If a certain product is the cheapest 
one available, demand increases ceteris paribus by 
approximately 2,000 euro. If, however, a competitor offers 
a cheaper product, demand decreases by approximately 
2,000 euro.
Figure 5: Demand function relative to the margin of 
competing banks
Notes: The graph shows differences in demand with respect to 
the cheapest competing bank offering an identical warrant, 
depending on the margin difference to this particular warrant 
(after controlling for a number of influential factors). The vertical 
bars indicate standard errors of the estimates.
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Figure 6: Demand function relative to the margin of 
similar products.
Notes: The graph shows differences in demand with respect to the 
cheapest similar product of the same bank, depending on the 
margin difference to this particular warrant (after controlling for a 
number of influential factors). The vertical bars indicate standard 
errors of the estimates.
Investigation findings for different warrants issued by the 
same bank are quite similar. Figure 6 illustrates that demand 
for a certain warrant is dramatically higher (by up to 15,000 
euro per day), if the same bank does not offer any cheaper 
comparable product. These results show that the decrease 
in demand is particularly huge if a cheaper competitor’s 
product or a similar product is available. The actual 
magnitude of the margin, however, is not very important. 
For a margin difference slightly above 0%, demand drops 
immediately and remains basically stable with increasing 
margin differences. These findings suggest that investors 
follow the “majority of confirming dimensions” heuristic 
of Russo and Dosher (1983). According to this heuristic, 
investors primarily judge whether a certain product is 
cheap or expensive relative to another product. They do 
not, however, incorporate the actual magnitude of the 
margin into their investment decision.
5. Conclusion
Despite recent literature characterizing individual 
investors as noise traders, we can show for the warrants 
market that these private investors do have cognitive 
abilities which allow them to invest price sensitively, or, 
margin sensitively. This conclusion is based on the demand 
function, which exhibits a convex decreasing shape, 
depending on the margin. Looking more closely at the 
demand function, we find that it is not the absolute margin 
that matters, but the margin difference to similar products. 
Investors compare margins or prices of related products 
offered by the same bank and by competitors. Demand 
for a warrant is particularly high when there is no cheaper 
comparable product. Furthermore, price sensitivity 
increases with investor size: Larger investors realize lower 
margins than smaller investors.
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Note
1. Parts of this article are based on Baule & Blonski (2012), Blonski (2014), Baule & Blonski (2015), and Baule and Blonski 
(forthcoming).
2. For more details see Baule & Blonski (forthcoming).
3. Warrants with a margin close to 0% have a demand which is about 5,000 to 10,000 euro higher than the most 
expensive warrants with a margin of about 15%. This value seems rather high relative to the average daily trading 
volume. However, this value is a ceteris paribus value—warrants with very large margins usually are out-of-the-money 
and exhibit short times to maturity, which causes the control variables to take on completely different values.
4. For more details see Baule & Blonski (forthcoming).
